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HIRSUTE JURISPRUDENCE:
AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
METHODOLOGY
JOSEPH

E.

FORTENBERRY*

"Doth not even nature itself
teach you, that, ifa man
have long hair it is a shame unto
him?"
- 1Corinthians 11:14
"Kids, be free. Be whatever you
are, do whatever you want to do,
just as long as you don't hurt
anybody."
-Hair, Act 1

A court which is asked to recognize a new constitutional right
is very much like a person offered a pig in a poke. The court can
always refuse to buy the pig, but it cannot very well go out of the
hogbuying business.' If it buys, the court may discover that it has
purchased a duck, a pony, or a rock.' It may also learn that it has
bought a very prolific shoat, one whose offspring become so
* A.B., Harvard University, 1966; J.D., Yale Law School, 1969. Member of the Alabama

and New York Bars.
I The classic statement of the duty of the courts is that of Chief Justice Marshall:
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably
to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803). See Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.).
2 Among the many cases in which the Supreme Court recognized a new constitutional
right and got something other than what it bargained for are Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962), where a decision that the eighth amendment and due process clause
forbade criminalization of drug addict status fostered the contention that criminal capacity
was a constitutional requirement, and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), where the
recognition of a right to openly and truthfully discuss matters of public concern led to the
advancement of picketing as a protected exercise of free speech.

1
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numerous as to threaten the business of other legitimate sellers of
3
porcine merchandise.
One way out of this dilemma is to put off the decision whether
to purchase. The court can say: "We may buy the pig, but not from
you" (standing);4 "We believe you ought to offer your hog to
someone else first" (exhaustion of remedies); 5 "We think your pig
is too young for market" (ripeness); 6 or "By George, your pig is
dead" (mootness).

7

The body of rules on deciding not to decide, known as "avoidance doctrines," is well recognized and of ancient lineage. 8 Properly used these rules can be of enormous benefit in assuring that
the court decides constitutional issues in the context of a genuine
controversy at the behest of a plaintiff who is "in a position to raise
the ultimate issue in the clearest and most fully developed fashion." 9 Thus, important constitutional decisions are arrived at only
when there is no reasonable alternative basis for decision by the
court and the constitutional questions which must be answered are
fully and fairly developed by the parties before the court. "Avoidance techniques," however, are not in and of themselves "passive
virtues." They may be utilized by the cowardly as well as the
prudent, and their use can leave the plaintiff and defendant unsure as to whether a claimed constitutional right and correlative
constitutional duty exist. Clearly, for many litigants an adverse
decision is better than no decision at all.
' See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). The Court in Baker spawned increased litigation by restricting the political question
doctrine and opening the reapportionment field to judicial scrutiny. The Brown Court
initiated a continuing caseload of segregation cases by holding that the "separate but equal"
doctrine is violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
" See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
'See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Douglas v. City ofJeannette, 319 U.S.
157 (1943); Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1932); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 6211 U.S. 210 (1908).
See, e.g., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);
Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961);
Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. .McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
'See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist
Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972) (per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404
U.S. 403 (1972); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (per curiam); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S.
103 (1969); Atherton Mills v. Johnson, 259 U.S. 13 (1922); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651
(1895).
'See A. BICKEL, THE LAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
BICKEL]. For an outline of avoidance techniques used by the Court see Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), aff'g 78 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1935).
9 BICKEL, supra note 8, at 123. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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Most studies ofjudicial artful dodging have concentrated upon
the Supreme Court of the United States because of its preeminence
as an interpreter of the Constitution and the great variety of
avoidance techniques from which it can choose.' 0 Lower federal
courts, however, have also been in a position to utilize avoidance
doctrines when asked to decide significant constitutional questions."
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was repeatedly called upon to decide
whether teenage male students could, consistently with the Constitution, be required to choose between foregoing the opportunity
to attend public secondary school or college and grooming themselves in a manner acceptable to the local school authorities. 12 In
other words, does the Constitution protect the right to grow one's
hair and beard in the manner one chooses and therefore circumscribe state interference with that right? The process of avoidance in which the Fifth Circuit engaged is especially instructive
because the question could neither be evaded, as it was time and
again by the United States Supreme Court, through denial of
certiorari, 13 nor resolved by waiting for higher authority, such as
Congress or the Supreme Court, to act. It is the thesis of this essay
that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit began its campaign
of avoidance hopefully, but soon departed from proper methods
0

See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 113-33; G. SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
203-16 (1960); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" -A Comment on Principleand
Expediency inJudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964); Kurland, Foreword: "Equalin Origin
and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REv.
143 (1964).
11But see BICKEL, supra note 8, at 198, wherein the author remarks that "the lower courts
can act in constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively ministerial decision-makers only."
12 For brevity's sake, these cases will be referred to as haircut cases, although in some
instances they involve beards and mustaches while in others the issue was hairstyle rather
than hair length.
'3 Marshall v. Oliver, 385 U.S. 945 (1966), appears to be the earliest in the long line of
haircut cases denied certiorari. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697
(5th Cir.) (regulation upheld), cert. denied, 393 U:S. 856 (1968); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969) (regulation unconstitutional), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (regulation upheld), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970); Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.) (regulation upheld), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1971) (regulation upheld), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979, 1042 (1972); Freeman v. Flake, 448
F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971) (regulation upheld), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); Karr v.
Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (regulation upheld), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (constitutional right recognized for college but not high school students), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973).
Recently, however, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal from a decision
holding that police department guidelines on hairstyle violate the due process clause in the
absence of a legitimate state interest requiring such regulation. Dwen v. Barry, 508 F.2d 836
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975). See 44 U.S.L.W. 3034-35 (July 22, 1975).
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and began a long slide into outright evasion of the constitutional
issue of a student's right to control his own grooming. It is not my
purpose to pull the court of appeals out of this "Slough of Despond" but only to indicate that there were "certain good and
substantial Steps" which the court, like Bunyan's hero Christian,
4
overlooked.1
FROM Ferrell TO Stevenson -

FIFTEEN

JUDGES IN

SEARCH OF A DOCTRINE
"[hf I be shaven, then
my strength will go from me,
and I shall become weak and
be like any other man."
-Judges 16:17

The Fifth Circuit's earliest haircut case, Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District,15 is an excellent illustration of the adage that
the first case coming before a court is usually a poor one to
announce new principles.16 The Ferrell litigation has strong overtones of the theater, and it is conceivable that the plaintiffs were
more concerned with publicity than with their "right" to long
hair. 7 If there is such a right, the plaintiffs were injured. Since
their assertion of that right had all the earmarks of a pretext,
however, they were not "in a position to raise the ultimate issue in
the clearest and most fully developed fashion.' 8 Nonetheless, the
Fifth Circuit in Ferrell ignored such impure standing and still managed to avoid deciding the constitutional issue directly.
The Ferrell plaintiffs were members of a musical group called
"Sounds Unlimited," and their contract called for them to maintain
"Beatle" haircuts,. 9 On the eve of the first day of class and in view
of their long hair, the plaintiffs' business manager, Mr. Alexander,
called the school principal, Mr. Lanham, to discuss the plaintiffs'
enrollment and to inform Lanham that he was coming to the
14J. BUNYAN, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS 17-18 (J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. rev. ed. 1954).
Through his failure to take "good and substantial Steps," Christian, a pilgrim on the path to
the Celestial City, lost his way in the "Slough of Despond," a mire composed of doubts and
discouraging apprehensions.
15261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
856 (1968).
6
See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 176.
17See text accompanying note 23 infra. For discussions of the controversy over hair
regulations in New York schools which occurred at the same time as Ferrell,see N.Y. Times,
Oct 16, 1966, § 4, at 11.
19 BICKEL, supra note 8, at 123.
9261 F. Supp. at 546-47.
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school. Lanham replied that he would talk only with students and
their parents. The following day the three plaintiffs, the mother of
20
two of them, and Mr. Alexander showed up at Lanham's office.
Refusing to meet with Alexander, Lanham told the students and
their parent that "the length and style of the boys' hair would
cause commotion, trouble, distraction and disturbance in the school
and, therefore, it was necessary for their hair to be cut or trimmed
before admittance would be allowed."'21 The plaintiffs refused,
22
whereupon two of them were denied admission to the school.
After this meeting the plaintiffs attended a prearranged press
conference. In addition, they recorded a protest song, played on
23
several local radio stations, about their plight.
Plaintiffs proceeded to bring a civil rights action 24 claiming
that denying them their right to attend school because of their hair
was "arbitrary, discriminatory, and violated the constitutional right
. . . to equal opportunity for a public education. '2 5 The district
court refused to grant the temporary injunction requested.2 6 After
noting its annoyance at what appeared to be a manufactured controversy, a challenge to the principal's authority in general rather
than a challenge to the hair regulations in particular, 27 the district
court disposdd of the constitutional issue of self-grooming by subjecting the regulation of hair to a "reasonableness" test2 8 and deciding that the lack of any showing of unreasonableness defeated the
challenge to the regulation. 29 Apparently, the court reasoned that
20 Reporting to the principal was contrary to the usual procedure for students which
called for them to report to their homerooms. Id. at 546. The appearance of the students at
Lanham's office and the ensuing publicity efforts, see text accompanying note 23 infra, lends
credence to the notion that the controversy was "staged."
21 392 F.2d at 699.
22 The third plaintiff had cut his hair during the summer and could not be refused
admission until nature restored his "standing." Id.
23 261 F. Supp. at 548-49.
24
Jurisdiction was based upon the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
2000a (1970). 261 F. Supp, at 546.
25 261 F. Supp. at 546.
261d. at 553. In addition to denying plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction, the
district court dissolved a temporary restraining order granted prior to the hearing. Id. at
546, 553.
27Id. at 552.
28Id. Accord, Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972); Torvik v. Decorah
Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d
205, 209 (3d Cir. 1971); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1971); Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970).
29 Before reaching the merits, however, the district court denied defendants' motion to
dismiss for want ofjurisdiction. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court noted,
had not been required in other dvfl rights contexts under § 1983 and therefore was not required here. 261 F. Supp. at 549, citing McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963)
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the school officials were authorized by state law to regulate hair
length, 30 that this right is a corollary of the officials' right to control
pupils under a grant of general police power, 3 1 that school regulations are part of the educational process,32 and finally, that the
application of the regulations in the face of a "takeover bid" by
some of the students was clearly justified. 3 3 Thus, if there is no
violation of state law and the school rule is reasonable, the district
court argued, that is the end of the matter.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit apparently did not
believe that this was an adequate disposition of the constitutional
question, for it devoted a considerable portion of its opinion to
exploring issues not touched on by the district court. Judge Gewin,
writing for the majority, began by saying "that a detailed statement
of the facts . . . is necessary.1 34 This observation is made more
significant by the facts he recites. While the district court opinion
suggested that there was little evidence of disruption caused by the
presence of long hair,35 the court of appeals indicated that the
evidence of actual and potential disruption in the form of fights
and obscene language was fairly strong.3 6 Judge Gewin relied on
(relief sought pursuant to a federal claim asserted under § 1983 need not first be sought in a
state court). See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 983-85 (2d ed. 1973). As to defendants' assertion
that a substantial federal question was lacking, the court reasoned that the right to attend
school on an equal basis with others is guaranteed under the Federal Constitution and
therefore the denial of that right would present a "frivolous" issue. 261 F. Supp. at 549.
Contra, Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972);
King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 979, 1042 (1972).
30
261 F. Supp. at 551 (semble).
31
Id.at 552 (semble).
32
Id.(semble).
33
Id.at 552-53 (semble). The court noted that:
The school principal felt that his authority was being challenged when the boys did
not follow the usual registration procedure, but came instead to his office with the
proposition that they were under contract to keep their hair "Beatle Length" and
did not intend to cut it .... [The terms upon which a public free education is
granted in the high schools of Texas cannot be fixed or determined by the pupils
themselves.
Id.
Plaintiffs' argument, alluded to in the foregoing quotation, that the school regulation
would cause them to breach their contract to keep their hair long was rejected by the court at
the outset of the opinion. The court reasoned that since the plaintiffs were minors the
contract was unenforceable as against them. Id. at 547. The court might have based its
rejection of this argument on an estoppel theory: if a constitutional right to control length of
hair exists, a court cannot enforce a contractual provision purportedly waiving this right by
agreeing to keep hair long. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) judicial enforcement
of restrictive terms of private agreements constituted state action for the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment).
34392 F.2d at 698.
35261 F. Supp. at 552.
36 392 F.2d at 700-01.
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this data to uphold the validity of the rule under Texas law37 and
then, turning to the federal constitutional issue, announced that
for the purpose of this decision it would be assumed that "a hair
style is a constitutionally protected mode of expression. ' 38 This is
not, however, the crucial part of the opinion. The critical phase
occurs in the next paragraph, wherein Judge Gewin stated that
each case must be analyzed within its own framework before a
determination concerning its constitutional implications may be
advanced.39 Judge Gewin thus armed the court with two formidable avoidance techniques for use in later cases: First, the constitutional right can be assumed "for the purpose of this opinion," thus
leaving it open for future courts to decide whether there is in fact
any constitutional right of expression through hair; and second,
the particular facts can be deemed not to violate the right of free
expression without having to decide whether or not the right actually exists.
Having done his part for posterity, Judge Gewin proceeded to
extricate himself from the problem created by the case before him.
Freedom of expression may be abridged if there are compelling
reasons to do so, and
[t]he compelling reason for the State infringement with which we
deal is obvious. The interest of the state in maintaining an effective and efficient school system is of paramount importance.
That which so interferes or hinders the state in providing the
7In view of the testimony of Mr. Lanham as to the various problems which arise in
the school due to the wearing of long hair by members of the student body and the
testimony of certain students that their hair style had indeed created some problems
during school hours, we cannot say that the requirement that appellants trim their
hair as a prerequisite to enrollment is arbitrary, unreasonable or an abuse of
discretion. Therefore, the school regulation as promulgated by the principal, banning long hair, is not violative of the state constitution or statutes.
Id. at 702.
38
Id. Accord, Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g 320 F. Supp. 852
(M.D. Pa. 1970) (regulation upheld).
39 392 F.2d at 702.
An interesting comparison may be drawn to those cases involving the military reserves
since the impact of a hair regulation on reservists and students extends beyond the reserve
meeting and the schoolroom. See, e.g., Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1972);
Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1264 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281,
1285 (Ist Cir. 1970); Harris v. Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Agrati v.
Laird, 440 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971), and Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.),petitionfor
cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 976 (1969), requiring reservists to cut their hair was held to be a
proper exercise of authority in light of military regulations calling for a "neat and soldierly
appearance." When it came to the wearing of wigs as part of one's right to self-grooming,
however, the Marine Corps' antiwig policy was upheld, Whitis v. United States, 368 F. Supp.
822 (M.D. Fla. 1974), while similar regulations were invalidated in the National Guard,
Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972), and in the Army Reserve, Harris v.
Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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best education possible for its people, must be eliminated or
circumscribed as needed. This is true even when that which 40is
condemned is the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.
This statement may be puzzling at first glance in that it seems to
elevate "effectiveness" and "efficiency" to the status of compelling
reasons, a status which they clearly do not enjoy. 4 1 What Judge
Gewin appears to have been saying, however, is that if long hair is
shown to have a serious disruptive effect on the educational process in the context of the case before the court, as it was here, it
may be proscribed. This same thought is expressed by Judge Godbold, who, in a special concurring opinion, observed that the public
expects and demands a safe and orderly atmosphere, maintained
by limited enforcement, wherein children may obtain a solid educa42
tion.
Judge Tuttle dissented on several grounds, and acceptance of
his reasoning would have put an end to "avoidance techniques" in
haircut cases once and for all. If there is a constitutional right, he
argued, "there is no countervailing state need or requirement that
would warrant such interference with the constitutional first
amendment right; " 4 3 hence, balancing and factual distinctions
would be excluded. Furthermore, basing a decision on the ground
that potential disturbances might result because of attacks upon or
insults hurled at students with long hair would not save the regulation since such a stance would recognize a "bystander veto" over
free expression. 4 4 Even if hairstyles are not constitutionally pro40

392 F.2d at 703.

41 See,

e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1969), wherein it was noted that
although "administrative and related governmental objectives" may bear a rational relationship to the state's purpose with respect to its welfare assistance program, such a classification
was not compelling enough to justify infringement of a fundamental interest such as the
right to travel. Id. at 633. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 347-51 (1972);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
42judge Godbold remarked:
Citizens expect and demand that their children be physically safe in the schools to
whose supervision they are consigned, and the citizenry is outraged if the schools
are less than safe and orderly. At the same time we expect that the requirements of
order, and of protection and implementation of the educational program of the
school, will be met by limited enforcement means - the force of the school establishment itself and of the school-related disciplines of reprimand, suspension, and
explusion - recognizing that the schoolroom is an inappropriate place for the
policeman to be either called or needed.
392 F.2d at 704 (Godhold, J., concurring).
43Id. at 705 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). Judge Tuttle, however, states that "the method of
wearing the hair is not constitutionally protected under the First Amendment ...." Id.
44Id. at 705-06 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). To recognize a "bystander veto" is to allow a
restriction to be imposed on the right of free expression because it is feared that a bystander
hearing the expression will be inspired to cause a breach of the peace by attacking a person
exercising the right. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 151-52 (1941). The
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tected, Judge Tuttle concluded, the state has created "an utterly
unreasonable classification of students ... in granting or denying
the right of a public education. '4 5 Such an "unreasonable classification" argument would apparently always require a decision in favor
of the student; for if excluding students thought likely to provoke
disturbance is "utterly unreasonable," it is hard to imagine what a
reasonable classification could be.
Ferrell is significant as not only the first but also, for a long
time, the leading Fifth Circuit opinion on haircuts and the Constitution. Its careful though somewhat oblique treatment of the
constitutional problem and skillful avoidance of a direct decision
on the constitutional issue are its great strengths. Its one weakness
is that anyone wishing to stretch or bend it can easily do so by
taking out selected paragraphs, such as the one extolling "effectiveness" and "efficiency," and using them to reach a result not
foreseen by the court. This weakness was not without its consequences; however, a brief examination of a district court opinion
decided before Ferrell reached the court of appeals adds insight to
the problems which were to develop.
47
In Zachry v. Brown,4 6 distinguished by Judge Gewin in Ferrell,
a district court in Alabama had shown how the constitutional issue
could be sidestepped and the student and his hair kept in school.
Zachry and his coplaintiff were also members of a band and wore
pageboy haircuts. They were enrolled at Jefferson State Junior College until they refused to cut their hair and were "administratively
withdrawn" for disobeying the rule. The college officials sued by
the Zachry plaintiffs were uncommonly candid. They admitted dismissing the plaintiffs because they disliked "exotic" hairstyles and
offered no disciplinary or other institutional justification for their
rule. 48 Aided by these helpful admissions, Chief Judge Lynne
made short work of the regulation on equal protection grounds.
Without alluding to any constitutional right to long hair, he merely
"bystander veto" has had a checkered career in the courts. Compare Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951) with Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). See also Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). In Massie v. Henry, 445 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) and Crews v.
Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970), it is suggested that school officials should
embark on a policy aimed at creating an attitude of tolerance to silence those students who
actually cause disruptions, rather than infringe upon the constitutional rights of long-haired
students.
45 392 F.2d at 705 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
"1299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
47 392 F.2d at 703. This distinction was based upon the lack of findings in Zachry that
long-haired students "had any effect upon the health, discipline, or decorum of the institution." Id.
48 299 F. Supp. at 1361.
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noted the unreasonableness of such regulations in support of
49
which no moral or social rationalization was offered.
Other judges were to be confronted with less cooperative officials and more perplexing problems of avoidance. In fact, in the
same month that Zachry was decided, a district judge in New Orleans was confronted with both. In Davis v. Firment,50 Dave Davis, a
high school sophomore and apparently unconnected with any rock
band, was suspended for violating a school regulation requiring
that hair not be exceptionally long. After losing an administrative
appeal, he immediately had his hair cut and was readmitted to
school.5 1 Davis' case, then, was free from any of the "impure
standing" problems which were present in Ferrell.52
Davis, like the Ferrell plaintiffs, relied on freedom of expression. 53 Although the district court denied that hair could symbolize
anything, 54 Judge Comiskey in Davis anticipated Judge Gewin's
approach in Ferrell by arguing that, assuming long hair was a form
of free expression, it could be regulated in these circumstances.
Judge Comiskey departed from Judge Gewin, however, in likening
hair to picketing, which can be regulated for less than compelling
49 [T]he defendants have not sought to justify such classification for moral and
social reasons. The only reason stated upon the hearing of this case was their
understandable personal dislike of long hair on men students. The requirement
that these plaintiffs cut their hair to conform to normal or conventional styles is just
as unreasonable as would palpably be a requirement that all male students of the
college wear their hair down over their ears and collars.
Id. at 1362.
"o269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
s5 269 F. Supp. at 526.
52
See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
53 269 F. Supp. at 527. See Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). Davis also relied on ninth amendment privacy
and eighth amendment freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. Neither of these
arguments met with any sympathy from the court. 269 F. Supp. at 529. In addition, the
court failed to discuss his fourteenth amendment claim. Id. at 527.
51 269 F. Supp. at 527. Indeed, a number of courts have held that hair length is of too
insignificant a communicative character to be constitutionally protected. See, eg., Freeman v.
Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v.
Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445,F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979,
1042 (1972); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (lst Cir. 1970). Moreover, plaintiffs
themselves have aided courts in avoiding the constitutional issue by admitting that their
hairstyle symbolized nothing. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 1971);
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971). Even those courts which have
recognized a constitutionally protected right to choose one's own hairstyle have been unsure
as to the origin of the right, although the first amendment has been considered one possible
source of authority. See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 937 (1970); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 418 (D. Vt. 1970). See also Finot
v. Pasadena Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967), where a teacher's
right to wear a beard was found to be protected by the first amendment and was referred to
as freedom of personality expression.
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reasons. 55 Thus, in Davis, the questions were "whether the School
Board had a legitimate interest in enforcing grooming regulations
and whether this rule was a reasonable means of accomplishing this
interest. '5 6 The questions having been posed in such a manner, the
court's affirmative answers came as no surprise.
Of unusual interest in the case, however, is the testimony on
disruptions. Judge Comiskey characterized it as "uncontradicted
evidence that hair grooming regulations by the Orleans Parish
School Board is [sic] based on disciplinary considerations. 57 The
evidence of disruptions, composed of the sentiments of local school
officials, was far from overwhelming. The superintendent seemed
to be merely expounding his educational theories, 58 and the principal only related past experiences at other schools and his apprehension that they will recur. 5 9 No evidence of any actual disturbance at the Kennedy High School, where Davis was a student,
appears anywhere in the opinion.
On these facts one might have anticipated a reversal of Davis
by the court of appeals. But the Fifth Circuit disposed of the merits
by holding that "there is no material difference between this case
and Ferrell" and thereby applied Ferrell as controlling. 60 It is
difficult to know what to make of the Davis opinion. That Davis
had "better" standing than the Ferrell plaintiffs may be immaterial,
but, unless one believes that the result would necessarily have been
identical under either test, the same cannot be said of Judge Comiskey's application of the "reasonable basis" test for constitutionality
instead of the "compelling interest" test laid down by Judge Gewin.
And what of the Ferrellinsistence that the validity of each restraint
55 269 F. Supp. at 527. See, eg., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
Picketing, which is more than free speech, is subject to restrictive regulations and, as such,
even peaceful picketing may be enjoined when it is aimed at preventing the effectuation of
the state's announced public policy. Id. at 293.
56
269 F. Supp. at 528.
57
1d.

51From my experience, I know that gross deviation from the norm does cause a
disruption of the learning atmosphere and can create an undesirable separateness
among students. Furthermore, gross deviation can be and has been dysfunctional in
the social adjustment of children. . . . Dress and appearance do have an effect
upon conduct and decorum.

Id.
50 During my tenure as principal of the McMain Junior High School and the John
McDonogh Senior High School fights occurred because of derogatory remarks
made to students with extreme hair styles. In addition to this, these extreme hair
styles have created distractions and disturbances in classrooms; therefore I instituted a regulation at the John F. Kennedy Senior High School that prohibited long
and shaggy hair or exaggerated side burns. I am very concerned with preventive
discipline.
Id. at 528-29.
60 408 F.2d at 1086.
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of free expression "be decided in its own particular setting and
factual background and within the context of the entire record
before the court ....,,?61 The record in Ferrell showed actual past

disruption of a serious nature at the school, not, as in Davis, mere
fear of disruption. If the court in Davis is implying that this is an
insignificant distinction, it never says so.
Davis' extreme brevity makes it difficult to determine what the
court is trying to do. Is it saying that anticipation of disruption is a
"compelling reason," or that since a "compelling reason" is unnecessary, anticipation of disruption need only pass the less stringent "reasonable basis" test? Is it modifying the Ferrell decision or
limiting it? It is impossible to say. The Fifth Circuit opinion in Davis
is thus an exceedingly cryptic one. It purports to follow Ferrell but
on facts that seem quite distinguishable. By refusing to do more
than announce a result and claiming to be compelled by Ferrell, it
avoids the necessity of deciding a constitutional question. It is hard
to be satisfied with an "avoidance technique" which fails to
adequately explain the result reached. 2
Griffin v. TatuM6 3 presented two new wrinkles in the haircut

law: First, it involved a regulation that proscribed not only long
hair but hair that was cut in particular ways; second, the justification for the regulation was based not upon "minimum public order" in the schools, i.e. the absence of fist fights and obscene
language, but upon "optimum public order" in the schools, i.e. the
absence of any conduct the school authorities deem to be undesirable. 64 Bobby Griffin was suspended from school and denied
readmission for having his hair "blocked" in the back rather than
"shingled" or "tapered" as required by the school's tonsorial regulations.6 5 The defendant school authorities offered a variety of justifications for these regulations: The students whose hair did not
conform spent excessive amounts of time combing their hair, failed
to wash their hair, were insufficiently eager to participate in sports,
61 392 F.2d at 702.

61 The Davis court, in justifying the constitutionality of the haircut regulation, obviously
did not heed the advice of the Supreme Court. Although faced with the task of construing a
statute rather than a regulation, Justices Holmes and Cardozo warned:
"A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score." .. . But
avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion.
George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (emphasis
added), quoting United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (Holmes, J.).
63 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969), modified, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970).
64 The terms "minimum public order" and "optimum public order" are derived from M.
McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD ORDER 121-22 (1961).
65 300 F. Supp. at 61.
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and caused resentment on the part of those students who did not
66
like the forbidden hairstyles.
Chief Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., had little patience with the
rule or its purported justification. While choosing not to resolve the
free expression issue, he upheld the "right to groom" on the basis
of a right of privacy. 67 In addition, he invalidated the action of the
school board on the basis of equal protection:
[I]n this instance the application of this haircut rule to this
plaintiff... constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification . . . . More succinctly, compliance with this haircut rule
imposes an utterly unreasonable condition to the plaintiff's con68
tinuing as a student in the Alabama public educational system.
The school's attempts to justify the rules on the basis of prevention
of undesirable conduct were quickly disposed of. Although the
school might act directly against the conduct these hairstyles supposedly cause, less drastic means than banning the hairstyles were
plainly available. The court also dismissed the school officials' "undifferentiated fear" of disruptions, echoing Judge Tuttle's remarks
on the "bystander veto,' 69 and concluded by invalidating both
Bobby Griffin's suspension and the haircut rule itself.70 Chief
Judge Johnson thus became the first district judge in the Fifth
Circuit to recognize explicitly the constitutional right to groom
one's hair as one pleases. When principal Tatum and a codefendant appealed the Griffin decision, the court of appeals was presented with the avoidance problem in an acute form.
The Fifth Circuit rose to the occasion, however, and managed
to uphold Bobby Griffin's reinstatement without ruling on the new
constitutional right.7 ' Judge Bell began by observing that the precise complaint made by Griffin did not attack the overall regulation
as invalid, but was limited to his suspension "for not having his hair
66

Id. Defendant Tatum also raised a "slippery slope" argument. If the court invalidated
the hair regulations, he suggested, the students would begin to wear their hair in "indecent"
styles. Id. at 63. Unfortunately, the opinion leaves the reader to speculate as to the nature of
these hairdos.
67 [There can be little doubt that the Constitution protects the freedoms to determine one's own hair style and otherwise to govern one's personal appearance....
[..
The freedom here protected is the right to some breathing space for the
individual into which the government may not intrude without carrying a substantial burden of justification.
Id. at 62. Accord, Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309
F. Supp. 114, 118 (D. Conn. 1970).
68 300 F. Supp. at 62.
6
Id. at 63. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
70 300 F. Supp. at 64.
7' 425 F.2d at 204.
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'cut to the liking of the School Administration.' ",72 He then
affirmed the decision, citing Zachry,7 3 on the basis that it was not
clearly erroneous to invalidate the "blocked" hair prohibition as
applied to Griffin. Apparently, the court felt that the district judge
was justified in reinstating Bobby Griffin because he, like the
plaintiffs in Zachry, was the victim of arbitrary and unreasonable
discrimination based on nothing more than the whim of the school
officials. Judge Bell, however, then proceeded to reverse the action
of the district judge in striking the entire haircut regulation as
unconstitutional, noting that the issue presented must be limited to
the regulation as applied to Griffin's "blocked" hairstyle.7 4 Judge
Bell concluded by referring explicitly to the avoidance doctrines as
expounded by Justice Brandeis and, curiously, to the doctrine that
5
federal courts will not render advisory opinions.7
Perhaps the most significant portion of the opinion from the
standpoint of the haircut doctrine is Judge Bell's comments on the
regulations themselves. Much of what he says reiterates the Ferrell
principles supporting regulations necessary for the maintenance of
a safe and orderly educational process. 7 6 Whether he was trying to
soothe the ruffled feelings of the school officials or suggesting that
Ferrell be extended to treat minor inconveniences as "compelling
reasons,"7 7 Judge Bell proceeded to apply the Ferrell principles to
the case at hand and suggested that the justifications for the rule,
had they been before the court, would have been upheld. 8
72
73

Id. at 203.

1d. The court of appeals also relied upon Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D.
Wis.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970), and Richards v.
Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), which
reached a similar conclusion on due process grounds. Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370
(S.D. Ind. 1969), later reversed on equal protection grounds, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970),
was cited for reflecting a contrary view.
74 425 F.2d at 204.
"7Id.The court, in a footnote, alluded to the problem of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, saying only that since no claim was made by appellants, the court would not sua
sponte apply the doctrine in this case. Id. n.2.
76 We have not denied school authorities.. . the right to promulgate reasonable
regulations concerning hairstyles. Such regulations and regulations which deal
generally with dress and the like are a part of the disciplinary process which is
necessary in maintaining a balance as between the rights of individual students and
the rights of the whole in the functioning of schools. The touchstone for sustaining
such regulations is the demonstration that they are necessary to alleviate interference with the educational process.
Id. at 203.
"See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra. In other courts, however, the requirement of fulfilling a "compelling reason" has often led to the demise of haircut regulations.
See, e.g., Long v. Zopp, 476 F.2d 180, 181 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Arnold v. Carpenter,
459 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 1972); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411,417 (D. Vt. 1970).
78 425 F.2d at 203-04.
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Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board of Education7 9 brought to the
courts still another wrinkle, this time a racial one, and signaled a
further broadening of the category of "compelling reasons." The
Stevenson plaintiffs' decision to make a claim of race discrimination,
however, worked to their disadvantage. One had to feel sorry for
Chief Judge Lawrence. He had, after all, just succeeded in fully
integrating the Wheeler County high school system by combining
an all-black school into a largely white one8" when three black
students refused to comply with the school's clean-shaven rule and
were suspended.8 1 No matter which way he ruled he was likely to
jeopardize the peaceful settlement of the desegregation question.
Many local blacks were keenly interested in the result and would be
likely to interpret a ruling in favor of the school as racist. Whites,
having just been deprived of their cherished freedom of choice
plan, would interpret a decision for the plaintiffs as another victory
for "them." Judge Lawrence grimly faced the task and upheld the
regulation.
The plaintiffs relied on a privacy argument combined with an
"ethnic identity" argument, 82 the latter presumably to circumvent
the fact that the regulation forbade both blacks and whites to have
beards and mustaches and had not been applied discriminatorily.
The school sought to justify the regulation on the ground that
unshaven students were "distractive. ' 83 Relying on some Supreme
Court language about hairstyle in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District84 and Judge Comiskey's opinion in Davis,
79 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.)j cert. denied, 400 U.S.
957 8(1970).
0
ChiefJudge Lawrence noted that he had entered an order on the desegregation issue
only two months earlier. Id. at 97-98. For a discussion of Chief Judge Lawrence's involvement in these cases, see Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 336 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Ga.), modified
mem., 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
81 306 F. Supp. at 98-99.
82
Id. at 99. This "ethnic identity" argument was accepted by Judge McRae in Braxton v.
Board of Pub. Instruction, 303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969), wherein a black schoolteacher
was ordered reappointed after having been dismissed for sporting a goatee. Observing that
the goatee was worn "as an appropriate expression of his heritage," Judge McRae held that
this type of expression was thereby guaranteed by first amendment "peripheral protection."
Id. at 959.
83306 F. Supp. at 99.
84393 U.S. 503 (1969), wherein the Court remarked that the "problem posed by the
present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to
hair style, or deportment." Id. at 507-08 (emphasis added). Further attention has been drawn
to this quotation in other decisions upholding haircut regulations. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt,
460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Freeman v. Flake,
448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v. Saddleback
Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 n.9 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979, 1042
(1972); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850 (1970). In Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1972) (per

16
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Chief Judge Lawrence held that hairstyle, including facial hair, was
not a form of pure speech and that school regulations should be
upheld whenever there is a rational basis for them.8 5 Therefore,
there was no necessity for the school board to show actual disrup86
tion of school affairs to have its rule upheld.
At the district court level, the Stevenson conclusion was precisely opposite to that of Griffin. Griffin upheld a constitutional
right to hair; Stevenson denies that such a right exists.8 7 The Fifth
Circuit in Stevenson was therefore confronted with an opportunity
to rule that there was no constitutional right to hair by merely
affirming Chief Judge Lawrence. Judge Bell, again writing for the
court of appeals, began by taking up where he had left off in
Griffin. Thus, exhaustion of remedies, merely mentioned in a footnote in Griffin,8 8 became in Stevenson a prerequisite to federal court
action. Stating that the district court should have required the
plaintiffs to bring their complaint before the board of education,
the court of appeals nonetheless proceeded to consider the case on
the merits since members of the board had testified in the lower
court that they would have sustained the suspensions.8 9 The court,
having thus imported yet another technique for not delving into
the haircut law, reduced the school's burden of justification to one
of proving that the rule is reasonable. The opinion ends on this
ominous note:
[T]he rule in question is founded on a rational basis, and.., it
was not arbitrarily applied. It follows that no substantial federal
constitutional question was presented. There the matter ends. 90
curiam), however, Tinker was cited to invalidate the regulation without specific reference to

the quoted passage.
85 306 F. Supp. at 100-01.
86 Counsel for plaintiffs makes much of the fact that the existence of facial hair
growth of a student has never created any incidents or commotion in the Wheeler
school system and that the regulation requiring shaving is therefore without basis in
reason and is arbitrary. The mere fact that a particular hair style or hirsute growth
on one's face has not created a classroom disturbance is not conclusive of its
unreasonableness. Students wearing mustaches or beards in a high school may be a
distracting influence on a student body which does not wear them. Teachers have a
right to teach in an atmosphere conducive to teaching and learning and unkempt
faces do not contribute much to it.
Id. at 101.
VThe Stevenson court stated that school officials, not judges, are the proper ones to
establish rules of conduct and applied a rational basis test to the rules promulgated by the
school authorities. Id. The student, therefore, is left with no right to long hair at all since an
unreasonable school regulation would be invalid whether the regulation pertained to constitutionally protected subjects or not.
"8 See note 75 supra.
89 426 F.2d at 1157. In Ferrell, however, exhaustion of administrative remedies had not
been required. 261 F. Supp. at 549.
90 426 F.2d at 1158.
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Stevenson appears to be the end of the line for long-haired
plaintiffs. The court of appeals is now provided with a whole
armory of avoidance techniques 9' and the school's burden of proving a compelling reason for the hair regulation, as required by
Ferrell, has been so lightened that the only school which would
seem likely to be unable to meet it is one which is run for the
amusement of the administration rather than the education of the
students. The Fifth Circuit's days of dodging the constitutional
issues in haircut cases, however, were far from over.
Calbillo, Wood, Whitsell, Glover, AND Dawson
-THEME

AND VARIATIONS

"[A~nd his strength went from him."
-Judges 16:19

San Jacinto Junior College officials decided that an excellent
way of keeping radicals and hippies from disturbing the serenity of
the campus was by forbidding students to have beards. Not unexpectedly, a student grew a beard to test the validity of such a
regulation. In Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 9 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit not only twice successfully avoided
ruling on the constitutional issue but also added new "avoidance
techniques" to its repertoire.
Although Judge Singleton of the Calbillo district court entertained a number of possible justifications for haircut rules, 93 he
warned that the school had the burden of proving that the rules
were necessary to deal with a genuine problem, not an imagined
one. 94 There was no evidence of disruptions caused by the wearing
91

Stevenson added exhaustion of remedies to the avoidance techniques of assuming the
constitutional right arguendo, suggested by Ferrell,and limiting the decision to the particular
facts, suggested by both Ferrell and Griffin. Of course a court could also follow Davis' lead by
merely citing Ferrell as controlling. See text accompanying notes 88-89, 38-39, 72-74 & 60
supra.
92 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969), remanded, 434 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1970) (per

curiam). Subsequently, on December 31, 1970, the district court dismissed the case as moot.
See Calbillo
v. San Jacinto Junior College, 446 F.2d 887, 888 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
93
See 305 F. Supp. at 859. The various justifications for haircut rules included "discipline, health, morals, physical danger to others, or 'distraction' of others from their school

work." Id.
94 Id. In so warning, Judge Singleton stated that the school authorities must demonstrate
"that the exercise of the forbidden rights would 'materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."' Id., quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (students'
right to wear black armband upheld in the absence of school disruption), quoting Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (students' right to wear "freedom buttons" upheld
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of beards; 95 indeed, the only evidence of adverse reaction was that
of a female student who had complained of the hippies' appearance and odor. 9 6 The school's contention "that beards and hair
styles are a sufficient indicator of potential campus troublemakers"
was dismissed as unsupported by the facts, common sense, or
logic. 97 The rule against beards, Judge Singleton concluded, was
therefore an unreasonable classification in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 98 Although the
district court felt it unnecessary to reach Calbillo's claim of first
amendment protection for the beard, 99 Judge Singleton remarked
that the regulation "was used as a catchall to enable school officials
to deny admission to those students whose beliefs might differ
from those of the school officials, clearly a First Amendment violation."

00

The district court's opinion in Calbillo presented the Fifth
Circuit with three areas where clarification would have been helpful. First, while Judge Singleton makes the analogy to Zachry' 0 1 in
rejecting mere individual preference as a justification for the regulation, 10 2 the underlying justification involved prevention of campus disruptions. Although the rule may suffer from overbreadth,
prevention of disruptions had been frequently recognized as a
valid justification, 10 3 and it is therefore difficult to see how the
regulation on beards could be explained away as a mere personal
whim. Second, like Stevenson, Calbillo measures school regulations
against a "reasonableness" standard and uses similar language to
describe the test. 10 4 Nevertheless, although Judge Lawrence in
in the absence of a showing that such expressive conduct interfered with the educational
process).
"s
305 F. Supp. at 859-60.
6
9 1d. at 860-61. This, the court held, was no more than expression of distaste which
could9 7 not count as a justification.
Id. at 861.
98Id. at 861-62. Here, the court also noted that the regulation forbade beards but not
mustaches.
19 Interestingly, Judge Singleton, citing Ferrell, referred to the Fifth Circuit's avoidance
of deciding whether a hairstyle may be considered expressive conduct protected by the first
amendment.
Id. at 862 n.7.
10 0
1d. at 862.
10 1
1d. at 861.
102Judge Singleton stated that since the court in Zachry refused to permit the school's
administration to promulgate haircut regulations based upon the administration's personal
preferences, it would be anomalous for the court to accept as justification for the regulation
the individual preference of a single student. Id.
10 See id. at 859-61 and cases cited therein; text accompanying notes 34-42, 56-60, 76-78
and notes 37, 42, 76 supra.
104 305 F. Supp. at 862; see text accompanying note 90 supra. For examples of other
decisions where the "reasonableness" standard was used see note 28 supra.
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Stevenson seemed willing to allow the school to do anything which is
not clearly unreasonable, Judge Singleton in Calbillo requires the
school to prove that the regulation bears a reasonable realtionship
to the well-being and discipline of students. Finally, although Judge
Singleton relies upon a variety of cases involving high school regulations, 10 5 nothing in Calbillo indicates that there is any legal distincdon between high school and junior college students or that the
regulation of one will be tested differently from the other.
The Fifth Circuit, however, did not need to address any of
these intriguing points or the constitutional questions. Between the
date of issuance of the injunction against the beard rule and the
time the case was heard by the court of appeals, Calbillo was
reinstated in school, shaved off his beard, and withdrew from San
Jacinto Junior College. Instead of reaching any decision, the Fifth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court
to consider whether the controversy is now moot, whether it
remains appropriate to enjoin the College from enforcing, in
whole or in part, the regulation against all students, and to
provide the College with the opportunity to revise its regulations
so that they are clearly related
to the maintenance of reasonable
06
discipline and decorum.
Although Judge Singleton duly dismissed the case as moot, one
month later, on his own motion and without notice to either Calbillo or the junior college, he entered an order alluding to a new
grooming regulation adopted by the school after the Fifth Circuit
had remanded the case.' 0 7 The Fifth Circuit had no trouble sidestepping any constitutional issues lurking in the postdismissal order:
Since the district court ...

did not have before it any justiciable

cause or controversy, requisite to jurisdiction, Article III, Constitution of the United States, the [postdismissal] Order .

.

. is

vacated
and the [dismissal] is affirmed, terminating this litiga108
tion.

Thus, Calbillo adds mootness and case or controversy to the Fifth
Circuit's long list of techniques used' 0 9 to avoid decision on
105 305 F. Supp. at 858-62, wherein Judge Singleton draws upon Tinker, Ferrell, and
Griffin, as well as Zachry.
1001434 F.2d at 610.
107
r See Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 446 F.2d 887, 888 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam). Judge Singleton's sua sponte order reinstituted the litigation, this time directed
against the school's amended regulation.
10 8 d. at 888.
1
"' See note 91 supra.
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whether there is a constitutional right to groom one's hair as one
pleases.
In Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School District," ° students
had participated with school officials in drafting the challenged
regulations.'
Assuming that the constitutional right applies and
2
forbids oppression by one's peers as well as by one's superiors,"1
how student participation confers reasonableness upon the regulation is unclear. Nonetheless, the district judge upheld the haircut
regulation." 3 Interestingly, however, he distinguished Zachry and
Calbillo, reasoning that there is a significant difference between
high school regulations and junior college regulations, 1 4 a difference which neither Judge Lynne nor Judge Singleton had noticed.
Perhaps indicating that haircut cases were becoming routine fare,
the court of appeals decided Wood without oral argument'1 5 and
held that the district court did not err in concluding that the
regulation "is not arbitrary or unreasonable and ... is sufficiently
' 16
related to alleviating interference with the educational process." "
There was no need for a lengthy opinion; the result followed a
7
fortiori from Stevenson."
In Whitsell v. Pampa Independent School District,"l the high
school reinstated the challenged regulations only after an experi110 308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).

"' Neale Wood was suspended as a result of his violation of the school's dress and
grooming code which was based upon recommendations submitted by a student committee
as well as advice received from "fashion and grooming experts." 308 F. Supp. at 551-52.
12See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1972) ("mere student participation" alone does not justify infringement of students' constitutional rights).
113 308 F. Supp. at 552-54. The district court closely followed the reasoning of Judge
Comiskey in Davis, wherein the responsibilities of the school in relation to the proper
maintenance of an educational atmosphere are held to support reasonable regulations
necessary to assure this objective. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra. Additionally,
Chief Judge Spears dismissed Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), as dissimilar on its facts and distinguished Breen v. Kahl, 296
F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937
(1970), as lacking the substantial justification put into evidence in Wood.
114 308 F. Supp. at 553-54, wherein it is observed that "considerations of discipline and
decorum" would appear to be quite different in applying regulations to a 14-year old high
school student, on the one hand, and a college student on the other.
'1 433 F.2d at 355. The court utilized 5TH CIR.R. 18 which permits disposition of a case
without oral argument.
11 433 F.2d at 356.
11 7
Stevenson approved delegating to school officials the authority to promulgate conduct regulations reasonably related to the proper operation of the school system. See note 87
supra.
The Fifth Circuit in Wood noted that, since the decision below had been handed down
prior to its decision in Stevenson requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, see text
accompanying notes 88-89 supra, it would make a determination on the merits rather than
remand. 433 F.2d at 355.
18 316 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Tex. 1970),aff'd, 439 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).

1975]

HIRSUTE JURISPRUDENCE

ment with no regulations on hairstyles had failed. 119 The school
officials' apparent willingness to modify the rules when they were
no longer necessary to the good order of the school gave added
weight to their opinions that the rules were now actually needed.
The district court upheld the regulation on the basis of this showing of necessity only after saying that first, the wearing of long hair
"is a right protected . . . by the Constitution;' 120 and second, that
"[a]bsent a strong showing of disruption or interference with the
educational process or with the rights of other students, such a
regulation would not be permitted to stand.'' Since the Fifth
Circuit had studiously avoided deciding the first of these propositions and indicated in Davis, Stevenson, and Wood that it did not
agree with the second, it is not surprising that on appeal the district
court received less than enthusiastic approval for its version of the
law. The Fifth Circuit held that "the conclusions of law not being
inconsistent with the appertaining law, it follows that the judgment
of the district court should stand."' 2
At this point it begins to look quite certain that, despite the
language in some district court opinions about the constitutional
right to grow one's hair as one pleases, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit would never squarely face the question of the
existence of that right or, in the alternative, would decide that the
right did not exist. After all, no plaintiff save Bobby Griffin had
ever won in the Fifth Circuit, and his victory was a pyrrhic one
since the court leaned over backwards to show that the regulation
was not invalid per se, but only as applied. Furthermore, no school
board's attempted justification for its rules, whether weakly or
strongly supported by the evidence, whether eminently reasonable
or plainly farfetched, had ever failed to secure the approval of the
Fifth Circuit. Indeed, in Glover v. Pettey, 12 3 the court of appeals
affirmed without opinion a determination in favor of a school
"ll It would appear that the disturbances which necessitated the reinstatement of a dress
code were more likely the result of a lack of supervision or a lack of a code regulating
wearing apparel than the consequence of no hairstyle regulations. See 316 F. Supp. at 853.
12
0Id. at 854.
12 1
Id. at 855. Similar to the district court in Wood, the district court in Whitsell also noted
the difference between college and high school disciplinary rules. Id. at 854.
122 439 F.2d at 1198.
123 Civil No. 70-784 (N.D. Ala., Oct. 26, 1970) (Grooms, J.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1971) (per curiam). Plaintiff, Gary Glover, was suspended when, in contravention of the
school hair code, he arrived at the Morgan County High School with hair that reached below
the collar of his shirt. Although he wore a hairnet so as not to appear to violate the rule, his
requests for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction were denied. The
district court stated that the rule was neither unconstitutional nor unconstitutionally applied.
Civil No. 70-784, at 3 (N.D. Ala., Oct. 26, 1970).
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board's haircut regulation. By invoking local rule 21, only used
when the court has determined that the writing of an opinion
would have "no precedential value,"'124 the Fifth Circuit found still
another avoidance technique available for the dodging of constitutional issues. Ironically, the court had theretofore remarked that
local rule 21 should be "sparingly used" and should never be
applied "to avoid making a difficult or troublesome decision or to
conceal divisive or disturbing issues. 1 2 5
Perhaps if the Dawson brothers had thought harder about
these developments, they might have considered it more prudent
to visit the barbershop instead of the federal court. Surprisingly,
however, their lack of circumspection was rewarded as they demonstrated that, even in the Fifth Circuit, the school does not always
win haircut cases. No one could call the Hillsborough County
school officials complacent. When their hair regulations were challenged in Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Board,126 the school
establishment struck back with the full panoply of justifications:
prevention of distraction 2 7 or disruption,' 28 the participatory way
in which the rules were adopted,'1 29 the educational value of having
rules, 30 the correlation between long hair and underachievement,' 3 1 the correlation between long hair and disciplinary problems, 1 32 a tendency on the part of long-haired students to be
socially maladjusted and clannish, 3 3 and the need for short hair on
the part of students seeking part-time jobs under the school system's vocational eduation program. 3 4 Nevertheless, the litany was
weighed in the balance and found wanting, either for lack of
evidence or irrelevancy to evils which the school had a right to
control.
The district court noted that the Fifth Circuit had "never ruled
explicitly on the question of whether the right to wear one's hair in
2

R. 21.
125 NLRB v. Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970) (Brown,
G.J.).
126 322 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 445 F.2d 308 (5th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
1 4 5TH CIR.

27

1 Id. at 299. The school superintendent's testimony on this point, rejected as unpersuaNew Orleans, see note 58 supra,
sive, is very similar to the testimony of the superintendent in,

cited with approval in Davis. Compare Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 528 (E.D. La. 1967)
with Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286, 290-01 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
128 322 F. Supp. at 299-300.

129 Id. at 300. Justifying a challenged regulation by reference to student participation in
its drafting had proven successful in Wood. See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
130322 F. Supp. at 301.

: 3 1 1d. at 301-02.
132
Id. at 302-03.
:33 Id.at 303.
13 4

Id.
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any desired manner" is constitutionally protected,'1 35 but went on to
conclude that the court of appeals had decided that there was such
a right by implication:
This Court concludes that the right to wear one's hair at any
desired length or manner is a federally protected right. If this
conclusion were incorrect, then the Fifth Circuit would not have
required a showing of interference with the educational process
for a hair regulation to be sustained. Stated differently, there
would be no reason for the courts to require evidence of classroom disruption if individuals did not have the right to wear
their hair as they wish; a compelling State interest is needed only
where the State encroaches upon personal freedoms, i.e., constitutional rights. Whether this right is characterized as protected
by the First Amendment (freedom of expression), the Ninth
Amendment (penumbral rights), or the Fourteenth Amendment
(right to reasonable and nonarbitrary classification) is of no import; the fact remains that hair style is a right because the Fifth
Circuit permits it to be regulated only upon a showing of a
subordinating State interest. 36
Dawson represents a return to the basic principles of Ferrell
with one difference: it decides that there is a constitutional right
instead of assuming it. The intervening cases, with their ready
acceptance of justifications offered for haircut rules, are swept
aside and the school board's reasons subjected to close (and withering) scrutiny. The district judge in Dawson threw down the constitutional gauntlet to the Fifth Circuit by refusing to follow the lengthy
line of cases which accepted reasonable apprehension of disorder
or fear of distraction as proper reasons for upholding hair regulations. Surprisingly, the court of appeals did not accept the challenge.
The court of appeals, only 18 days after Glover and without
135 Id.

131Id. at 304. This is not, strictly speaking, a correct conclusion. A rule that all students
must carry all their schoolbooks with them at all times would not be invalid for violating any
constitutional freedom from unnecessary burdens, but because it is patently unreasonable.
Due process and equal protection forbid the federal government and the states from
engaging in utterly irrational regulation of conduct even though the conduct is itself not
constitutionally protected. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974). On
this basis Zachry and perhaps Calbillo are correctly decided even if there is no constitutional
right to wear one's hair as one pleases. But the district court is correct in concluding that if
there is no constitutional right to long hair, the "compelling interest" test used in Ferrell
would not have been the proper test, and, therefore, that its very use in Ferrell implies the
existence of a constitutional right. The district court in Dawson seems to overlook the
language in Ferrellwhich indicates that the constitutional right was only assumed to exist and
the use of the "rational basis" test -appropriate to regulation of conduct which is not
constitutionally protected -by
the district court in Davis and the court of appeals in
Stevenson.
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oral argument, held the district court's factual determinations "not
clearly erroneous" and affirmed, citing Ferrell and Griffin.'37 A
petition for rehearing en banc was denied, with none of the judges
requesting a polling of the court. 38 The constitutional question
which had so carefully been avoided for years had apparently been
decided in three short, unremarkable sentences. Nothing about the
Dawson opinion indicated that a storm was brewing in the Fifth
Circuit, a storm which would soon shatter the serenity of the entire
court.
Karr v. Schmidt-

AN END TO LONG HAIR?

"0 dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon,
Irrecoverably dark, total eclipse
Without all hope of day!"
-J. MILTON, Samson Agonistes, Act 1

Karr v. Schmidt 39 started out in familiar fashion with the teenage boy being kept out of high school because his hair was too long,
the boy and his father suing the school board, and the board
rounding up the usual justifications in its defense. Nor is there
anything new about the elements of the district court's reasoning.
As in Griffin, classification by hair length was found to be violative
of equal protection and the right to wear one's hair in the way one
wants was deemed protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 40 Karr, however, differs greatly from
most earlier cases in its tone: the district court seemed tired of
hearing the school board advance the necessity for haircut rules as
some sort of a priori proposition which needs no evidentiary support.' 4 1 Indeed, the court seemed determined to make an end of
hair regulations. Length of hair, the court insisted, is irrelevant to
any reasonable classification which the state may make, since "there
137 445 F.2d at 308. See note 115 supra. It must be noted, however, that the judges
affirming Glover were Judges Gewin, Bell, and Morgan while those affirming Dawson were
Judges Coleman, Simpson, and Wisdom. For a comparison of their future positions on these
issues see notes 150 & 162 infra.
138 445 F.2d at 308.

139 320 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972). The only novelty in Karrwas that it was brought as a class action
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2). 320 F. Supp. at 731; accord, Lansdale v. Tyler Junior
College, 318 F. Supp. 529, 534-35 (E.D. Tex. 1970). The district court in Karr noted that in
view of the court's dismissal of the claim for damages, it hardly mattered that this was a class
action, "since any grant or denial of the declaratory and injunctive relief sought... would
...satisfy the alleged class." 320 F. Supp. at 730.
140 320 F. Supp. at 735-36. Accord, Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62-63 (M.D. Ala.
1969).
141 320 F. Supp. at 736.
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is no reasonable relationship between the length of male high
school students' hair and any alleged disruption of the educational
process it is defendants' duty to maintain. ' 142 While the opinion
limited itself to the facts of the case, 1 43 the implication of the
decision is clear: in ordinary circumstances, the schools have no
power to enforce hair length regulations because those regulations
are not reasonably related to a valid governmental purpose. The
existence of a constitutional right to wear one's hair as one pleases,
which the court affirmed,'1 44 is thus not essential to establish the
student's right to be free from regulation of hair length by schools.
Karr pointed the way toward a constitutional ban on haircut regulations regardless of the answer courts may give to the question of
whether the Constitution guarantees a right to long hair. It is thus
not surprising that the case created considerable disquiet in the
court of appeals, for it threatened to undo the balance between
school rights and student rights which the Fifth Circuit had taken
great pains to maintain.
The district court had, of course, enjoined the enforcement of
the hair length regulation. On motion of the school authorities, the
court of appeals stayed the injunction pending appeal. 1 45 Karr then
petitioned Mr. Justice Black, in his capacity as circuit justice for the
Fifth Circuit, for an order vacating the stay of injunction. 46 The
great Alabama jurist saw the issue as bordering on the frivolous
and seemed annoyed that anyone should seek to have the Supreme
Court waste its time on matters so inconsequential.' 47 Justice
Black's opinion denying Karr's petition ended with the suggestion
that hair length is a matter better left to the states than to the
federal courts.' 48
142

Id.

text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
F. Supp. at 735-36.
14'See Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1201-02 (1971) (Black, Circuit J.).
14'1d. at 1201-03. In McCune v. Frank, Civil No. 74-C1279 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 13, 1974)
(Mishler, C.J.), vacated and remanded, 521 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1975), Justice Marshall, acting as
circuit justice for the Second Circuit, denied a similar motion, this time for a temporary
injunction, Newsday, Sept. 16, 1975, at 24 (Sept. 15, 1975). The motion had been made in
hopes of blocking departmental disciplinary action by the Nassau County Police Department
until the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a similar hair length regulation
already before the Court. See Dwen v. Barry, 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 421 U.S.
987 (1975).
147 401 U.S. at 1202-03. Accord, Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (no substantial constitutional claim asserted); King v.
Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979,
1042 (1972) (no substantial constitutional claim asserted); Greenwald v. Frank, 32 N.Y.2d
862, 299 N.E.2d 895,346 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1973), aff'g mem. 40 App. Div. 2d 717, 337 N.Y.S.2d
225 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.) (Nassau County patrolman asserted no constitutional question).
148 401 U.S. at 1203, Accord, Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 259-61 (10th Cir. 1971),
143Id. at 733 n. 18. See also
144 320
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When the Fifth Circuit decided, at length, the appeal in Karr, a
plurality of the judges sought to use this suggestion of Justice Black
as the means for disposing of the haircut cases once and for all.
Karr, which had seemed at the district court level to signal the
demise of school haircut regulations, ended in the court of appeals
with an announcement that such regulations are per se valid.
The court of appeals decided Karr v. Schmidt en banc, producing a total of five opinions. 1 49 The actual vote for reversal was
eight-to-seven, and the opinion of the court by Judge Morgan
represented the view of a seven-judge plurality. 50 This plurality,
like the district court, wanted to put an end to haircut cases but
chose to do so by cutting off the student's right rather than by
denying the school's power. A fundamental right to long hair, the
court said, is not "to be found within the plain meaning of the
Constitution."'' The question reserved in Ferrell, and apparently
answered positively in Dawson, thus received a resounding "no."
Although the plurality recognized that mere negation of the constitutional right did not require reversal because the haircut regulation might pass the reasonable relation test, 52 it had no trouble in
discerning that the regulation met this standard. 1 53 Lest the reader
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972). Subsequently, on appeal, the entire Supreme Court denied
Karr's petition. Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 930 (1971).
149460 F.2d at 609.

150 To enable the reader to tell the players, I offer the following scorecard. The authors
of the various opinions are the first judges listed in each column:
FOR REVERSAL (8)

Opinionof
the court

Special
concurrence

FOR AFFIRMANCE (7)

Dissent
Dissent
Dissent
Morgan
Bell
Wisdom
Godbold
Roney
Gewin
Brown
Brown
Coleman
Thornberry
Thornberry
Ainsworth
Goldberg
Simpson
Dyer
Simpson
Clark
Ingraham
1 460 F.2d at 613.
152 1d. at 616.
153In such cases, the appropriate standard of review is simply one of whether the
regulation is reasonably intended to accomplish a constitutionally permissible state
objective....
...The record nowhere suggests that their [the school authorities') goals are
other than the elimination of classroom distraction, the avoidance of violence
between long and short haired sudents, the elimination of potential health hazards,
and the elimination of safety hazards resulting from long hair in the science labs.
Id. at 616-17. It is unclear whether the court is saying that haircut rules are plainly rational,
contrary to the decision of the district court, or whether the court means that the absence of
any proof of bad motive on the part of the school board is proof of reasonableness. See id. at
622 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has refuted the
claim made in the plurality opinion that long hair constitutes a safety hazard in the science
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fail to discern where all this was leading, the conclusion of the
opinion removes any lingering doubts about the validity of haircut
regulations:
Given the very minimal standard ofjudicial review to which these
regulations are properly subject in the federal forum, we think it
proper to announce a per se rule that such regulations are
constitutionally valid. Henceforth, district courts need not hold
an evidentiary hearing in cases of this nature. Where a complaint
merely alleges the constitutional invalidity of a high school hair
and grooming regulation, the district courts are directed to grant
an immediate motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for
154

which relief can be granted.

The Karr plurality managed to enlist seven judges to deny the
existence of a constitutional right to wear one's hair as one desires.
The minority rallied six judges to the defense of such a right, 1 55
leaving the remainder of the court, Judges Bell and Godbold,
standing squarely in the middle. Judge Bell specially concurred in
the result, indicating that he thought the rational basis standard for
judging haircut regulations was properly invoked by the plurality
and observing that Stevenson had already applied that test. He
seemed content to find that the reversal was required by application of prior case law and indicated that the plurality could have
reached its result through clarification of the principles of that case
law.' 56 Judge Godbold, dissenting, would likewise have continued
to follow existing case law, but would have affirmed the district
lab by stating that hairnets, rubber bands, etc., can be used to prevent such hazards. Massie
v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972).
154 460 F.2d at 617-18 (footnote omitted), citing Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 262
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972). The opinion ends with a curious
confession that the federal courts are incapable of protecting all the rights of every American:
The federal judiciary has urgent tasks to perform, and to be able to perform them
we must recognize the physical impossibility that less than a thousand of us could
ever enjoin a uniform concept of equal protection or due process on every American in every facet of his daily life.
460 F.2d at 618. This is a surprising admission in light of the fact that the court has just
declared that there is no constitutional right to long hair. It makes one wonder whether, if
there were more federal judges, students would be held to have more rights.
15- Four judges concurred with Judge Wisdom who would have upheld the right on
equal protection and due process grounds, 460 F.2d at 619-21 (Wisdom, J., dissenting),
while Judge Roney, writing for himself alone, would have upheld the right on privacy
grounds in special circumstances such as Karr where the student is required by law to attend
school. Id. at 624-25 (Roney, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 618 (Bell, J., concurring), citing Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154,
1158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970) (application of rational basis test); Griffin v.
Tatum, 425 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1970) (arbitrary application as denial of due process and
equal protection) and Bicknell v. United States, 422 F.2d 1055, 1057 (5th Cir. 1970) (arbitrary law denotes absence of a rational basis). See text accompanying notes 88-90 & 71-78
supra.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

court, reasoning that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review
required acceptance of the facts as found by the lower court. He
seemed equally appalled at those who wanted to use Karr to expand the scope of student rights and those who wished to use it "to
get the courts out of hair cases. 15 7 Karr v. Schmidt thus ends
inconclusively with neither side in the constitutional battle able to
obtain a majority. Technically, the law remained as it was after
Stevenson. In fact, however, high schools were never again to lose
on haircut regulations in the Fifth Circuit. The drama was at an
end - or, almost at an end.
Lansdale-

A

RIGHT REVIVED

"But the hair of his head began
to grow again after it had been shaved."
-Judges 16:22

The immediate sequel to Karr was predictable- summary
disposition of high school haircut cases.' 58 What was not predictable, however, was the advent of a second en banc haircut case
which would produce an even more sharply divided court than did
Karr.
On its face, Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College' 5 9 was not very
different from Calbillo.'6 0 The district court, rejecting the defense
that the regulation served to eliminate hippies and radicals from
the student body, invalidated the regulation on equal protection
grounds as unreasonable and discriminatory. 16 1 The court of appeals affirmed in an en banc decision which featured no fewer than
eight separate opinions. 62 The trend toward abandoning case-bycase adjudication in favor of judicial legislation, evident in Karr,
became fully explicit in Lansdale. Judge Clark's opinion for the
majority is the most original and startling disquisition on haircut
law ever to issue from the Fifth Circuit. Although it is ultimately
157 460 F.2d at 624 (Godbold, J., dissenting). Judges Thornberry, Simpson, and Chief
Judge Brown joined in this dissent.
18 See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Quitman Indep. School Dist., 461 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam); Southern v. Board of Trustees for Dallas Indep. School Dist., 461 F.2d 1267
(5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
159318 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
160 Perhaps the most significant difference between Lansdale and Calbillo was that one of
the plaintiffs in Lansdale was an "ancient" veteran of the Vietnam conflict, 22 years of age.
318 F. Supp. at 531.
161 Id. at 552-53.
162 470 F.2d at 659. The Lansdale scorecard, see note 150 supra, is as follows:
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unpersuasive in its attempts to distinguish high school students
from junior college students and its herculean efforts to square its
results with those of Karr, it is deserving of high praise for its
completely novel approach to the problem which had vexed the
court for several years. Perhaps it demonstrates that the logical
outcome of repeated avoidance of constitutional questions is not
necessarily principled adjudication, but may instead be unprincipled judicial invention.
Judge Clark began by observing that the facts of an individual
case are irrelevant to the validity of the regulation. 163 If one has
seen one haircut case, one has seen all haircut cases. Since facts do
not matter, it is appropriate to announce a rule upholding all hair
regulations or striking them all down. Karr took the path of upholding all haircut regulations for high school students, but Lansdale
declared that one cannot follow that path in the case of college
students, not because college students possess a constitutional right
which high school students lack, but because as a matter of law
the college campus marks the appropriate boundary where the
public institution can no longer assert that the regulation of this
liberty is reasonably related to the fostering or encouragement of
education. The value of the liberty hasn't64changed, rather the
setting in which it is to be exercised has.
FOR AFFIRMANCE (9)

Opinion of
the court

Concurrence

Special
concurrence

Special
concurrence

Special
concurrence

Special
concurrence

Clark

Brown

Wisdom

Bell

Godbold

Simpson

Thornberry

Wisdom
Goldberg
Brown (in part)

Morgan

FOR REVERSAL

Dissent

Brown
Goldberg
Thornberry
(6)
Dissent

Dyer
Roney
Gewin
Coleman
Ainsworth
Ingraham
163 [T]his sameness of the campus life in the respective grade and high school and
collegiate environments means that judicial scrutiny of haircut regulations in these
institutions almost never calls for what is truly an adjudication of facts.
Id. at 661. Judge Clark also noted that:
The most important tenet in my reasoning is that the decision either that hair must
be cut if the student is to continue his education at the school because the regulation
is deemed reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, or that the school must
strike the regulations from its records because it has no rational basis and therefore
arbitrarily infringes a valid constitutionally protected liberty, is wrongly cast if put
in the mold of a determination of fact from record evidence.
Id. at164661-62.
Id. at 662. Interestingly, in addressing the issue of whether the Constitution protects
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Having reached this decision, Judge Clark is now obliged to untie a
pair of difficult knots by justifying his line of demarcation and
explaining how the Karr plurality's denial of the existence of a
constitutional right to long hair can be reconciled with a decision
that colleges have no power to regulate hairstyles. 5
Judge Clark first justifies the line of demarcation by an appeal
to certainty. 66 Plainly, this is pertinent only to the desirability of
having a line without giving any reasons for drawing it one place
rather than another. According to Judge Clark, the line is drawn at
college because college students, unlike high school students, often
live away from home in a dormitory, can usually vote, and are
subject to the draft. 1 67 None of these factors is very convincing.
Putting to one side the large number of junior college and college
students who continue to live at home, 1 68 it would appear to make
greater sense for the college to have more regulations for students
than the high school precisely because students are living away from
home and are no longer subject to parental protection and supervision. The sudden change from being at home and subject to strict
supervision to being on one's own at college appears to justify
regulation rather than to counsel against it.
The right to vote at age 18 likewise proves nothing. In view of
an individual's choice of hairstyles, other courts have made no such distinction between high
school and college students. See, e.g., King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979, 1042 (1972); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp.
248 (D. Neb. 1970). Teachers, however, have been distinguished from students and accorded more freedom to groom their hair as they please. See, e.g., Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F.
Supp. 713 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (due process and equal protection grounds); Braxton v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (due process clause and first
amendment's freedom of expression); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969)
(due process); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520
(1967) (due process clause and first amendment's freedom of expression).
In determining whether there is a right to wear one's hair as one desires, distinction has
also been made between prisoners and unconvicted detainees. Compare Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (prisoner's right to long hair denied) with
Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268 (D.N.H. 1972) (right of unconvicted detainee to wear a
beard or goatee is protected by the fourteenth amendment but subject to reasonable regulation).
-65Compare Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 611, 613, 615-16, 618 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
banc) with Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
166 The redeeming virtue of a per se rule, which far outweighs its shortcomings, is
that it is more realistic and more equitable in its overall operation than random
judicial "fact" fiats that treat one student one way and another virtually identically
circumstanced student another. By differentiating between grade and high schools
on the one hand and colleges on the other, we bring to academic regulation of hair
style as much order as the inherent vagaries of a system of judge-make [sic] law will
permit.
470 16
F.2d
at 662.
7
1d. at 662-63.
168 It is suggested that one of the chief reasons for the existence of a junior college
system is to enable students to save money by living at home while attending college.
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the large number of 18-year olds in high school and 17-year olds in
college, the arbitrariness of drawing the line based on educational
attainments rather than on age is evident. Furthermore, it is clear
that there was no constitutional right to vote at age 18 until the
twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution was adopted. As a
result, any independent constitutional significance to that age is
difficult to support. The right of college students to vote presumably means that they can influence haircut rules at public colleges
through the political process, an option not open to most high
school students. The draft argument is also insubstantial. Like the
right to vote, the draft is based on age and, consequently, should
apply to some high school students and not to all college students.
In addition, half the students in college are not subject to the draft
at all because of their sex, while presumably both men and women
are subject to dress and hair codes. 1 69 No one can quarrel with the
proposition that the average college student is more mature than
the average high school student; however, this proposition by itself
cannot justify denying colleges the right to regulate students' hair
while permitting high school officials to do so.
Judge Clark's reconciliation of Lansdale with Karr fares no
better than his attempt to justify his line-drawing. Karr, we learn,
upheld the constitutional right to choose one's hairstyle while
holding that the school's power to regulate hair was, in the case of
high school students, paramount to that right.' 7 0 This proposition
is justified not by quotations from Karr, but by the argument that
first, Judge Morgan, who wrote the Karr plurality opinion, joins in
Judge Clark's Lansdale opinion; and second, the Karr opinion
would not have been so lengthy and weighty had it only announced
the nonexistence of the constitutional right.' 7 ' While there are
passages in Karr's plurality opinion which intimate that hairstyle is
constitutionally protected,' 7 2 there are a great many more places in
173
which it is flatly stated that there is no such constitutional right.
Judge Morgan's concurrence may only indicate that he has
changed his mind in the matter, and the length and substance of
1r9 See, e.g., Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970),
wherein a female student's challenge of a haircut regulation prevailed based on the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
170470 F.2d at 663. But see Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 611, 613, 615-16, 618 (5th
Cir. 1972) (en banc), denying the existence of a constitutional right to wear one's hair at a
particular length.
171470 F.2d at 663 n.3.
172 See 460 F.2d at 618, quoted in note 154 supra; 460 F.2d at 615 n.13.
173 Judge Dyers dissent in Lansdale quotes five statements from Karr to this effect. Id. at
665-66 (Dyer, J., dissenting), citing 460 F.2d at 609, 611, 613, 615-16, 618.
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Karr may as easily be ascribed to the fact that it sought to overrule a
long line of cases as to concern with preserving the constitutional
right to long hair. Judge Clark ends the opinion with a ringing
declaration of the constitutional right to choose one's hairstyle,
accompanied by a loophole for "unusual circumstances" comparable to the Karr loophole for "irrational regulations":174
In the absence of a showing that unusual conditions exist, the
regulation of the length or style of a college student's hair is
irrelevant to any legitimate college administrative interests and
any such regulation creates an arbitrary classification of college
students. Because no such unusual circumstances existed here,
the regulation adopted in the instant case violates both the due
process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth
17 5
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Chief Judge Brown concurred, applauding the court for rejecting the tyranny of facts, but questioning the advisability of the
use of per se rules.176 Judge Bell also concurred, referring to the
1 77
necessity of a "legislative judgment of the kind involved here."'
Judges Wisdom and Godbold wrote short concurring opinions
adhering to their dissenting opinions in Karr.17 s Judge Simpson
concurred in the result, but stressed that he believed no haircut
regulation was consistent with the Constitution and pointed out the
arbitrariness of Judge Clark's line-drawing. Judge Simpson's closing remarks are very much to the point:
This Court en banc strained mightily and conscientiously over
these two cases. The net result of the effort is unfortunately not a
glorious one. Our stance as a court emerges as unsatisfactory because it is arbitrary and inconsistent - to members of the
Court with directly opposing views. Surely these are grounds for
1 79
re-examination of both decisions.
As the dissenting judges correctly observed, there is little or nothing in Karr to support the Lansdale result, and a great deal in
174 See text accompanying notes 149-54 and note 153 supra.

175470 F.2d at 664. See also Mick v. Sullivan, 476 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(right to choose one's hairstyle protected by the due process and equal protection clauses of

the fourteenth amendment); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971) (protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th
Cir. 1970) (protected by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
176470 F.2d at 664 (Brown, C.J., concurring).
177Id. at 664-65 (Bell, J., concurring).
177'1d. at 664, 665 (Wisdom & Godbold, JJ., separately concurring).
1 1Id. at 665 (Simpson, J., concurring).
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Karr which indicates the nonexistence of the right upheld in
Lansdale.18 0
On this discord, the haircut saga ends. Excessive avoidance of
the constitutional issue had led to litigation and more litigation; the
court reacted by proclaiming "No more" in Karr; but when confronted by the absurdity of the Karr rule applied to grown men,
the court was forced to back off and amend Karr to make it
inapplicable to college students. Perhaps if the court had not been
so eager to avoid the issue in the first place, it would not have been
so perplexed in the end.
CONCLUSION

-

"CERTAIN

GOOD

AND SUBSTANTIAL STEPS"

"As thou knowest not what is the
way of the Spirit, nor how the
bones do grow in the womb of
her that is with child: even
so thou knowest not the works of
God who maketh all things."
-Ecclesiastes 11:5

In explaining where the Fifth Circuit went wrong, one ought
not overlook the conditions under which the court worked. During
most of the haircut years the court had its present contingent of 15
judges, ordinarily sitting in panels of 3. Having 12 judges staring
over one's shoulders cannot make the decision any easier, and it
must inevitably predispose the 3 sitting judges to compromise and
make ambiguous statements. Nor does the possibility of a rehearing en banc facilitate the judges' task, since the entire panel of 15
may, as in Karr and Lansdale, be unable to agree. As if this were not
enough of a problem, the Fifth Circuit had to operate under a
crushing caseload1 8 1 which included a variety of decisions of
greater difficulty and wider impact than the haircut cases. 182 Even
180

Id. at 665-66 (Dyer & Roney, JJ., separately dissenting).
8'aSee COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE,
62 F.R.D. 223, 230-34 (1973), where it is stated that the Fifth Circuit handles "almost
one-fifth of the total filings in the 11 circuits," with a caseload per judge which is "23 per
cent more than the national average." Id. at 230. See also NLRB v. Clothing Workers Local
990, 430 F.2d 966, 968-69 nn. 4-7 (5th Cir. 1970).
182 See, e.g., Sperry & Hutchin'son Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970), modified, 405
U.S. 233 (1972) (extent of FTC jurisdiction); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (attorney-client privilege in corporate setting);
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970), reu'd sub nom. United States v. Mitchell,
403 U.S. 190 (1971) (taxation of community assets); Palmer v. Thompson, 419 F.2d 1222
(5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), aff'd, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing of public swimming pools to
prevent desegregation).
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after taking all of this into account, the performance of the court is
still far from exemplary, and one contributing factor must certainly
have been the court's continuing refusal to decide the constitutional question before Karr arose. That the proper case for deciding the issue was lacking cannot be used to justify avoidance of the
constitutional question. Davis v. Firment' 83 presented the constitutional question plainly and simply. Certainly, Davis, in this respect,
was a better case than Ferrell, Stevenson, or Griffin, all of which were
complicated by their unusual facts. Nor can the possibility that the
Supreme Court was likely to act and resolve the constitutional
conflict be used to justify the Fifth Circuit's continued avoidance.
By 1970 at the latest it must have become apparent that the high
84
court would not hear haircut cases.'
183 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La, 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
See text accompanying notes 50-62 supra.
184 See note 13 supra. No guidance having been offered by the Supreme Court, conflicting decisions as to the constitutionality of grooming regulations have issued from the several
circuits. The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have been the least sympathetic towards
the existence of a constitutional right to grooming. As shown herein, although the Fifth
Circuit has held that in the absence of "unusual circumstances" college regulations are
violative of the due process and equal protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment,
high school regulations have been upheld. The Sixth Circuit was content to follow the Fifth
Circuit's Ferrell decision and applied a "reasonableness" test to uphold hairstyle regulations
in Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1971), and Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213
(6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
disposed of the issue by viewing an alleged right to grooming as an insubstantial question
involving no constitutional issue. See, e.g., Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404-U.S. 979, 1042 (1972).
Although the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all recognized the
existence of the right to choose one's own hairstyle and generally forbid interference with
that right, these courts of appeals differ on both the origin of and protection to be afforded
the right to grooming. In Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972), and Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1971), the courts located the right within the personal
liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment; the regulations themselves, however, were
tested against a reasonableness standard. The Fourth Circuit, while also relying upon the
fourteenth amendment as the source of the right to choose one's own hairstyle, has, on the
other hand, required authorities to show a "compelling necessity" for interference with that
right. See, e.g., Mick v. Sullivan, 476 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Massie v. Henry,
455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits, agreeing that hairstyle
regulations must be justified by necessity and that a substantial burden of proof should be
placed on the school authorities, have disagreed on the origin of the right. The Seventh
Circuit relied on the ninth, penumbra of the first, and equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendments, see, e.g., Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972); Crews
v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970), while the Eighth Circuit listed the ninth amendment, privacy
penumbra of the Bill of Rights, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
see, e.g., Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F.21 779 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam);
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
In Dwen v. Barry, 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975), the Second
Circuit recognized that police department guidelines on hairstyle were, in the absence of a
compelling state interest, violative of the fourteenth amendment. See U.S.L.W. 3034-35 (July
22, 1976). Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined a number of their
district courts in recognizing a right to personal grooming. See, e.g., Harris v. Kaine, 352 F.
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Finally, the failure to decide the issue cannot be justified by
invoking the specter of the Dred Scott case.18 5 A court which had
been interfering with school boards almost continually since the
early 1960's and administering desegregation decrees in spite of
protests, letters, and "segregation academies" could not honestly
argue that it feared that school boards would resign rather than
allow students to have long hair or that children too young to vote
would rise up and defy haircut regulations the court held constitutional. Indeed, the school district in Pampa, Texas, which voluntar8 6 If
ily abandoned hair regulation, can hardly have been unique.
failing to decide the constitutional question in the haircut cases
cannot be justified on grounds of necessity or prudence, can it be
justified on the basis that it did no harm to delay decision?
No matter how one feels about the constitutional issue, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that prejudice resulted from the

court's delay. As long as the court was committed to both the
existence of an assumed constitutional right to long hair and a
desire to avoid substituting its judgment for that of the school
board, the rights of one party or the other were bound to be lost in
the vague generalities of the decisions. Either the school board was
forced to meet a "compelling interest" standard for its regulations
when the proper standard was that of "reasonable relation," or the
student had to demonstrate an utter lack of rationality in the
regulations when all the constitution required was a less burdensome alternative. The court's refusal to take a stand necessarily
Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); Crossen v.
Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has apparently not been faced with
the task of ruling on grooming standards promulgated by such state-supported bodies as
school systems or governmental agencies. When asked to decide the constitutionality of
hairstyle regulations within the private sector, however, the District of Columbia Circuit
found that the employer's standards were violative of neither the first, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments nor the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970),
as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). See, e.g., Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co.,
481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d
1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (employer's regulations upheld); Baker v. California Land
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974) (employer's regulations upheld); Longo v. Carlisle
DeCoppet & Co., Civil No. 75-3276 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 22, 1975), dis'cussed in 174 N.Y.L.J. 81,
Oct. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 3 (employer's regulations violate Civil Rights Act); Note, Employer
Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 965
(1973).
185
See, e.g., V. HOPKINS, DRED SCOTT's CASE (1951); S. KUTLER, THE DRED SCOTT
DECISION: LAW OR POLITICS? (1967); 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES

HISTORY 279-319 (rev. ed. 1947); C. WILSON, THE DRED SCOTT DECISION (1973), wherein it
is demonstrated that the Court's activism in Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
led inevitably
to the Civil War.
18 6
See text accompanying note 119 supra.
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meant that one side had fewer rights than it would be entitled to
had the court made up its mind.
As Karr demonstrated, a flat decision for either the existence or
nonexistence of the constitutional right would have put an end to
litigation. The absence of such a decision made it easier for school
boards to promulgate grooming regulations in the hope that such
regulations would survive challenge in the courts, and, encouraged
the students to attack the regulations on constitutional grounds.
The exasperation of the Karr plurality with the proliferation of
litigation is plainly open to a tu quoque objection. What, then,
should the court have done? What steps should it have taken?
Davis is plainly the point at which the court left the proper path.
Its failure to produce a full, written opinion explaining the disposition of Davis resulted in uncertainty as to whether "proof of disruption," "suspicion of disruption," or some third standard of proof
was applicable. After the court's refusal to make the Davis case the
occasion for decision of the constitutional question, and by the time
the question of constitutional right was raised again in such a pure
fashion, the tradition of avoidance and ambiguity was firmly established, and the court could take refuge in past opinions no matter
how it decided.
The court, whatever its decision in Davis, could also have taken
steps to clarify the doctrine of "efficiency" expounded by Judges
Gewii and Godbold in Ferrell. If the Ferrell opinion had been made
more concrete by subsequent decisions, the constitutional question
would have been much more difficult to avoid, and the court's
work in enforcing or refusing to recognize the constitutional right
would have been plainly visible. As it was, the vague generalities of
Ferrell grew more vague through age.
Finally, the court of appeals could have paid greater attention
in its earlier opinions to the implications of the plaintiffs' different
ages. 18 7 There was ample precedent, even in constitutional matters,
for treating children differently than adults. 188 The Fifth Circuit's
18 ' See Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J.,
concurring) (semble), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
188See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-37 (1968) (minors under 17
barred from receiving sex-related magazines); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (different
treatment of adults and minors within the judicial system noted); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944) (statute prohibiting a minor under 12 from selling newspapers
or other articles upon the street or other public places upheld). But cf. Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.").
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failure to exploit nonage as a factor enabling the school board to
interfere with the student's rights and its emphasis on the existence
or nonexistence of a right rather than the propriety of interfering
with that right based on the student's age led to the embarrassing
juxtaposition of Karr and Lansdale. Moreover, it resulted in the
unsatisfactory rule that college and high school students, regardless
of age, are entitled to different treatment.
The. Fifth Circuit's haircut odyssey is over. It effected no great
change in legal relationships, produced no startling new principles,
and resulted in no enduring opinions. It did, however, demonstrate the perils of continually postponing constitutional choice. It
showed that, even in matters of ephemeral interest, a refusal to
decide the meaning of the Constitution, however justifiable that
refusal, will eventually serve to weaken the court and ultimately the
Constitution itself.

